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The Robot Koseki: 





After touching on some of the conceptual and practical 
hurdles facing the developing field of robot law, this 
article will describe the Japanese koseki system of family 
registration and then explain why it offers a source of 
models and analogies that are useful in the development 
of a framework for regulating robots.    
INTRODUCTION: WHAT TO DO ABOUT ROBOTS 
A review of the growing body of literature on the relatively 
new subject of “robotics law” reveals a number of common 
themes. For example, many works reflexively reference 
Isaac Asimov’s famous but fictional “three laws of robotics” 
as a touchstone,1 though it is unclear whether they will 
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1 See, e.g., Bryan Casey, Comment, Amoral Machines, or: How 
Roboticists can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Law, 112 NW. U.
L. REV. 1347, 1351–52 (2017); Gabriel Hallevy, The Criminal Liability 
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prove to offer any useful guidance in the real world. 2
There already being a growing body of literature on the 
subject of whether autonomous armed drones or other 
robotic weaponry should be allowed to make “kill” 
decisions without human intervention, 3  with some 
authors advocating in favor of doing so, even Asimov’s 
most important, first law (“A robot may not harm a human 
being”) seems unlikely to be implemented in the real 
world.4
Other common themes addressed in the literature 
on robot law include who (if anyone) should be liable when 
of Artificial Intelligence Entities 2–3 (Feb. 15, 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) https://ssrn.com/abstract=1564096. The three laws of 
robotics were first introduced in “Runaround,” a 1942 short story that 
was included in Isaac Asimov’s book, I ROBOT.
2 Professor Laurel Riek & Professor Don Howard, A Code of Ethics 
for the Human-Robot Interaction Profession, Presentation at the 
WeRobot Conference (Apr. 4, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2757805 (“In the robot ethics literature, Isaac Asimov’s laws of 
robotics (Asimov, 1942) have so dominated discussion about the ethics 
of human-robot interaction as to eclipse the day-to-day ethical 
challenges facing HRI research, development, and marketing.”). The 
“Asimov-as-starting” point notion is not limited to Western writers. 
In one of the few Japanese books on the law of robots, Professor 
Susumu Hirano also starts his discussion of the subject with the 
Three Laws, also noting that Asimov subsequently added a “zeroeth” 
law (“A robot may not injure humanity or, through inaction, allow 
humanity to come to harm”) in his 1985 book, Robots and Empire.
Susumu Hirano, ROBOTTO H? [ROBOT LAW] 9–22 (2017). 
3 See, e.g., Michael Schmitt & Jeffrey Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: 
Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 241 (2013); William C. Marra & Sonia K. McNeil, 
Understanding “The Loop”: Regulating the Next Generation of War 
Machines, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1139, 1155 (2013). 
4  John Yoo, Embracing the Machines: Rationalist War and New 
Weapons Technologies, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 443, 488 (2017) (suggesting 
that “[d]eployment of robotics could advance the humanitarian goal of 
reducing the death and suffering of combat, once it begins, far more 
effectively than a complete ban.”).
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robots cause harm, 5  whether robots can or should be 
subject to criminal liability, how robots should act when 
faced with the “trolley problem,”6 who should enjoy the 
benefits of whatever value a robot or its programming 
creates (such as intellectual property),7 how to address 
disagreements between human and robotic “experts,” 8
the ethics of human-robot interactions,9 whether robots 
5 See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals Liability 
Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 125 (2014); F. 
Patrick Hubbard, Regulation of and Liability for Risks of Physical 
Injury from “Sophisticated Robots” at 44, Presentation at the We 
Robot Conference (Apr. 21–22, 2012), http://robots.law.miami.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/01/Hubbard_Sophisticated-Robots-Draft-1.pdf. 
6 See, e.g., Sabine Gless, Emily Silverman & Thomas Weigend, If 
Robots Cause Harm, Who is To Blame? Self-Driving Cars and 
Criminal Liability, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 412, 420 (2016); David Levy, 
When Robots Do Wrong, in COGNITIVE ROBOTICS 3, 6–11 (Hooman 
Samani, ed., 2016); Hallevy, supra note 1, at 4; Abhuiday Chandra, 
Liability Issues in Relation to Autonomous AI Systems 4 (Sept. 29, 
2017) (unpublished manuscript) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3052154; 
Peter Asaro, Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective 
(January 20, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with HUMLab, 
Umeå University of Umeå, Sweden); Peter Asaro, The Liability 
Problem for Artificial Agents, ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (2015). The trolley problem is a classical 
ethics problem involving a choice between operating a switch so as to 
prevent a runaway trolley from running into a group of people but in 
doing so cause it to run into a single or lesser number of people. Casey, 
supra note 1, at 1348–49 (noting that in 2016 Mercedes announced 
that it would deal with the real-world version of the problem by 
programming its self-driving cars to protect passengers at the 
expense of pedestrians if necessary).
7 See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity, Copyright and the 
Artificially Intelligent Author, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 21 (2012); 
Ralph D. Clifford, Intellectual Property in the Era of the Creative 
Computer Program: Will the True Creator Please Stand Up? 71 TUL.
L. REV. 1675, 1681 (1997). 
8 Millar & Kerr, infra note 36, at 104. 
9 See, e.g. Riek and Howard, supra note 2, at 1.  
The Robot Koseki 
406 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
should be granted legal personality,10 pay taxes,11 have 
freedom of speech or any other rights,12  or simply be 
treated by the law the same as humans.13
Possible answers to these various questions tend 
to start from seemingly familiar, neighboring areas of 
existing law: products liability, tort and insurance law for 
10 Possibly the earliest proposal that robots, or rather AI, be accorded 
legal personality was made by Lawrence Solum, in 1991. Lawrence B. 
Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231, 1255–56 (1992). See, e.g., Joanna Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis 
& Thomas D. Grant, Of, For, and By the People: The Legal Lacuna of 
Synthetic Persons (U. Cambridge Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 
5/2018, 2018); Evan J. Zimmerman, Machine Minds: Frontiers in 
Legal Personhood 38 (Aug. 28, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract 
=2563965. 
11 See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should Robots Pay 
Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
145 (2018). See, e.g., Ryan Abbott & Bret Bogenschneider, Should 
Robots Pay Taxes? Tax Policy in the Age of Automation, 12 HARV. L.
& POL’Y REV. 145, 149 (2018). 
12 See, e.g., Toni Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech 
Rights and Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. L. REV. 1170, 1173 (2016); 
Nathan Heller, If Animals Have Rights, Should Robots?, NEW YORKER
(Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/if-
animals-have-rights-should-robots; David J. Gunkel, The Other 
Question: Can and Should Robots have Rights?, 20 ETHICS INFO. TECH.
87, 88 (2017); Joanna J. Bryson, Robots Should Be Slaves, in CLOSE 
ENGAGEMENTS WITH ARTIFICIAL COMPANIONS: KEY SOCIAL,
PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL AND DESIGN ISSUE 63, 63 (Yorick Wilks ed., 
2010). 
13 Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of Humans 2 
(Oxford Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 27/2017, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941001 (“If [the deep normative structure 
of a society] is utilitarian, smart robots should, in the not too distant 
future, be treated like humans. That means that they should be 
accorded legal personality, have the power to acquire and hold 
property and to conclude contracts.”). 
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self-driving cars,14 the laws of conflict for killer drones,15
corporate law for robotic legal personality,16 and so forth. 
Even efforts to address the subject more holistically seem 
to do so by referencing recent noteworthy interactions of 
law and new technology, such as Ryan Calo’s seminal 
2015 article Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw.17
Yet none of these approaches seem likely to lead to 
the development of a foundational “law of robots,” though 
that might be what is actually needed. For all the talk of 
robots as an emergent technology, perhaps the laws we 
need to consider for dealing with them are not as new as 
we think. For example, the ancient remedy of deodands—
suing animals or even inanimate objects that cause harm 
so they can be taken, sold and the proceeds used for 
compensation—might be a perfectly plausible way of 
14 See, e.g., Victor Schwartz, Driverless Cars: The Legal Landscape,
in TORTS OF THE FUTURE 5, 9 (U.S. Chamber Inst. Legal Reform (June 
14, 2017)); Stephen S. Wu, Product Liability in the U.S. and 
Associated Risk Management, in AUTONOMOUS DRIVING: TECHNICAL,
LEGAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS 553, 553–54 (2016); Steven Seidenberg, 
Who’s to Blame When Self-Driving Cars Crash?, ABA J. (July 2017), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/selfdriving_liability_hig
hly_automated_vehicle?icn=most_read; John Villasenor, Products 
Liability and Driverless Cars: Issues and Guiding Principles for 
Legislation, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REP. (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/products-liability-and-
driverless-cars-issues-and-guiding-principles-for-legislation/; 
Vladeck, supra note 5, at 125 (discussing generally how existing rules 
of products liability could apply to AI-enabled machines). 
15 See, e.g., Christopher Ford, Autonomous Weapons and 
International Law, 69 S.C. L. REV. 413, 416 (2017); Schmitt & 
Thurnher, supra note 3, at 243.  
16 See, e.g., S.M. Solaiman, Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations, 
Idols and Chimpanzees: A Quest for Legitimacy, 25 ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE AND L. 155 (2017), http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=4088&context=lhapapers.  
17 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
513, 552 (2015). 
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dealing with robots that commit torts or crimes, 
particularly expensive ones whose owners would thus 
have an incentive to pay attention to their safe use and 
procure insurance.18
After all, the law has been dealing with artificial 
persons—corporations—for centuries, and there is 
already useful literature on the analogies to corporate law 
and the legally significant differences between 
corporations and robots.19 An obvious difference, of course, 
is that corporations only “think” though human agents, 
and lack the ability to directly affect the physical world. 
The point is that the idea of recognizing separate legal 
status in something artificial is hardly new.  
The law has also been dealing with unpredictable 
moving creatures—animals—for centuries. Some writers 
have even suggested that regarding robots as animals 
might be an appropriate response for the legal system.20
Of course this may also not be a wholly useful analogy in 
that it does not address whether and how to attribute 
property or other rights, agency or legal personality to 
robots. It also potentially leaves victims potentially 
uncompensated for harm caused by “wild animal” robots, 
where the person responsible for introducing them into 
human communities can be identified. Nonetheless, there 
would seem an ample source of antecedents for robot law 
in what many technology lawyers may regard as the dusty 
corner of tort and property law. As we shall see, the more 
18 See, e.g., Edmund W. Burke, Deodand – A Legal Antiquity That 
May Still Exist, 8 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 15, 15–16 (1930); 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289–90.   
19 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
20 Enrique Schaerer, Richard I. Kelley & Monica N. Nicolescu, Robots 
as Animals: A Framework for Liability and Responsibility in Human-
Robot Interactions, Presentation at the 18th IEEE International 
Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication 72
(Sept. 22–Oct. 2, 2009). 
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modern practice of “chipping” pets by embedding RFID 
tags containing identifying information is another area 
where animals provide a useful reference for a system of 
regulating robots.21
Then there is family law, which few if any authors 
seem to mention as a possible reference. Yet family law 
may actually offer the best source of analogies for a law of 
robots. After all, it is widely expected that robots will 
increasingly come to live in our homes as servants or 
companions (many already do in the form of vacuum 
cleaners or toys), and there is already a healthy (?) 
discourse on the subject of robot sex partners.22
21 See, e.g. Habib Do?an, Mehmet Caglar, Musa Yavuz & Mahmut 
Gözel, Use of Radio Frequency Identification Systems on Animal 
Monitoring. 8 SDU INT’L J. OF TECHNOLOGICAL SCI. 38, 39 (2016) (the 
use of similar technology by some humans within the context of an 
employment relationship for purposes such as access to facilities is 
also highly relevant to the type of system of robot regulation proposed 
by this article); Mary Bowerman, Wisconsin Company to Install Rice-
Sized Microchips in Employees, USA TODAY (July 24, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2017/07/24/ 
wisconsin-company-install-rice-sized-microchips-employees/5038670 
01/ (‘“We foresee the use of RFID technology to drive everything from 
making purchases in our office break room market, opening doors, use 
of copy machines, logging into our office computers, unlocking phones, 
sharing business cards, storing medical/health information, and used 
as payment at other RFID terminals,’ CEO Todd Westby said in a 
company statement. ‘Eventually, this technology will become 
standardized allowing you to use this as your passport, public transit, 
all purchasing opportunities, etc.’” Whether the use of such 
technology is appropriate for the private or public regulations of 
human beings is, of course, an important question. However, the 
answer to that question is arguably irrelevant to whether comparable 
technology would be useful in regulating robots).  
22 See, e.g., Chelsea Summers, There are a Lot of Problems with Sex 
Robots, MEDIUM (July 26, 2018), https://medium.com/s/future 
human/there-are-a-lot-of-problems-with-sex-robots-38ea0c17b7db. 
See also, Gutiu, infra note 35, at 187. 
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 Family law may be a useful reference because it 
addresses a collective in which individual members may 
be liable for or benefit from what is essentially a social 
unit, a collective enterprise: the family. One of the basic 
problems with characterizing how the law should deal 
with robots is that each robot is effectively a discrete unit, 
but one whose existence and actions are usually the result 
of a collective enterprise: manufacturer, programmer, 
owner, user and so forth.  
Many of the questions about robotics law 
summarized at the beginning of this article stem from the 
ability of robots to act with agency in a way that affects 
the physical world in a potentially harmful way, combined 
with uncertainty as to the allocation of rights and 
responsibilities accruing to robot behavior. Like robots, 
children have agency and can move unpredictably in the 
physical world, causing harm to others. Family law has 
been dealing with parental liability for the torts and 
crimes of minors for a long time.23 Many of the issues of 
robot law might be amenable to an approach that sees 
robots treated analogously to “perpetual children.” The 
provisions on parental liability for harm caused by 
children contained in §316 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts might provide as useful a model for allocating 
responsibility for robots as anything in products liability 
or criminal law—if we could just figure out who the 
“parents” are, a definitional and informational issue we 
will turn to shortly.24  Similarly, questions like who is 
23  See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Tort Liability for Intentional Acts of 
Family Members: Will Your Insurer Stand By You?, 68 TENN. L. REV.
1, 6 (2000); Jason Emilios Dimitris, Comment, Parental 
Responsibility Status—and the Programs that Must Accompany Them,
27 STETSON L. REV. 655, 661 (1997).  
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: DUTY OF PARENT TO CONTROL 
CONDUCT OF CHILD § 316 (AM. LAW INST. 1965):
A parent is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control 
COLIN P.A. JONES
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entitled to manage and dispose the fruits of a robot’s labor 
are also a fairly standard issue of family law in the parent-
child relationship, at least they were in days gone by.25
Children are not the only area of family law that 
may be a useful reference. The field also deals with 
responsibility for adults with diminished capacity, those 
judicially declared incompetent or subject to guardianship 
or conservatorships.26
Family law might also offer useful analogies in 
areas where there is an odd silence in the current 
literature about robot law. While some writers express 
concern about excessive liability hindering innovation in 
robotics, nobody has gone so far as to suggest there should 
be a “parent-child immunity” rule that would make 
recovery difficult for harms caused as between the robot 
and its owner or developer.27 Similarly, those advocating 
independent legal personhood do not seem to have gone so 
far as to advocate it rendering robots able to 
independently bring suit in their own name, including 
against their owners or other parties involved in their 
his minor child as to prevent it from intentionally harming others 
or from so conducting itself as to create an unreasonable risk of 
bodily harm to them, if the parent: 
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to 
control his child, and 
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for 
exercising such control.  
25 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *453 (“A father 
has no other power over his son’s estate, than as his trustee or 
guardian; for, though he may receive the profits during the child's 
minority, yet he must account for them when he comes of age. He may 
indeed have the benefit of his children's labour while they live with 
him, and are maintained by him: but this is no more than he is 
entitled to from his apprentices or servants.”). 
26 See, e.g., DANBY P. FRY, THE LUNACY ACTS (1864). 
27 See, e.g., Gail D. Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in 
Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 489 (1982). 
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existence or operation. Corporations can sue their own 
directors and shareholders,28 and parents may be subject 
to suits by or on behalf of their children, so why not robots 
who can sue their owners and creators, or robot 
whistleblowers able to independently inform authorities 
of human malfeasance?29 Similarly, if we are to worry 
about the “abuse” of robots, as some writers have 
suggested we should,30 why not allow them legal recourse 
against their abusers, or at least allow third parties to 
seek such recourse on their behalf? Here too we see 
existing family law on subjects such as child and elder 
abuse offering a potentially useful model for regulation.  
Finally, family may be a useful reference because, 
as we shall see later in this article, family status and the 
way it is authenticated can be an important aspect of a 
person's legal identity. And robotic identity—what 
constitutes a robot?—is a central element to many issues 
of robot law. 
28 See, e.g., Eleanor Bloxham, A Lazy, Expensive Way to Intimidate 
Shareholders, FORTUNE (Mar. 14, 2014), http://fortune.com/ 
2014/03/14/a-lazy-expensive-way-to-intimidate-shareholders/ 
(“Corporations unhappy with shareholder proposals are taking their 
frustrations to federal court, suing investors . . . .”); David Hall & Matt 
Walker, When Can a Company Sue its Directors for Their Illegal Acts?,
BURGES SALMON (May 2015), https://www.burges-salmon.com/-
/media/files/publications/open-access/when_can_a_company_sue_its_ 
directors_for_their_illegal_acts.pdf; Michelle Singletary, Daughter 18, 




29 Perhaps this is a matter for joint discussions with those who focus 
on when autonomous weapons should be allowed to kill humans, 
including possibly their owners or creators, including in self-defense.   
30 Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The 
Effects of Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior 
Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW 213–35 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 
2016). 
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I. CROSSING THE DEFINITIONAL 
THRESHOLD 
Before we can get to the potentially fruitful subject of 
considering family law analogies for robots, however, we 
have to overcome a more basic definitional issue that still 
bedevils much of the literature on the subject of robot law: 
What is a robot?  
A great variety of definitions have been offered. 
The RoboLaw project co-funded by the European 
Commission proposes the following answer to the question, 
“What is a robot?” 
According to the most widespread 
understanding, a robot is an 
autonomous machine able to 
perform human actions. Three 
complementary attributes emerge 
from such a definition of robot: 
They concern: 1) physical nature: it 
is believed that a robot is unique 
since it can displace itself in the 
environment and carry out actions 
in the physical world. Such a 
distinctive capability is based on the 
assumption that a robot must 
possess a physical body. Indeed, 
robots are usually referred to as 
machines; 2) autonomy: in robotics 
it means the capability of carrying 
out an action on its own, namely, 
without human intervention. 
Autonomy is usually assumed to be 
a key factor in qualifying a thing as 
a “robot” or as “robotic”. In fact, in 
almost all dictionaries definitions, 
including authoritative sources 
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such as the International Standard 
Organisation (ISO 13482), there is 
always a reference to autonomy. 
Finally, 3) human likeness: the 
similarity to human beings. 31
(footnotes omitted).
This definition is indeed comprehensive, though 
some may question whether “human likeness” is or should 
be a central feature of the definition. Much of the 
literature introduced earlier in this article addresses 
technology systems that are not humanoid, or are AI 
systems that do not have any physical manifestation at all. 
Moreover, what “human likeness” means itself seems like 
an entirely separate definitional problem fraught with 
minefields.
More examples can be found in the 2016 book 
Robot Law, which contains almost as many definitions of 
robots as the number of chapters by its various 
contributors.32 For example, Neil Richards and William 
Smart propose: 
“[a] robot is a constructed system 
that displays both physical and 
mental agency but is not alive in the 
biological sense.”33
Another author in the same volume offers as the definition 
of a social robot: 
31 Erica Palmerini et al., Guidelines on Regulating Robotics 15 (2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.robolaw.eu/RoboLaw_files/ 
documents/robolaw_d6.2_guidelinesregulatingrobotics_20140922.pdf. 
32 Neil Richards & William Smart, How Should the Law Think About 
Robots?, in ROBOT LAW 3, 5–6 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016). 
33 Id. at 6. 
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“A physically embodied autonomous 
agent that communicates and 
interacts with humans on a social 
level.”34
Yet another describes a particular subcategory of robot—
a sexbot—as: 
“a combination of existing artificial 
(AI) technology, sensory perception 
capabilities, synthetic physiological 
responses, and affective com-
puting.”35
Two other articles discuss the subject in terms that are 
essentially inconsistent with these formulations, doing 
away with the physical manifestation entirely and 
focusing on the AI aspects of a robot. IBM’s Watson 
supercomputer is referenced in the context of robot and 
human expert disagreement,36 and another chapter does 
so in the context of automated law enforcement.37
Writing from a Japanese perspective, Professor 
Hirano Susumu suggests a robot can be defined as a 
34 Darling, supra note 30, at 215. 
35 Sinziana M. Gutiu, The Roboticization of Consent, in ROBOT LAW
186, 187 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016). 
36 Jason Millar & Ian Kerr, Delegation, Relinquishment and 
Responsibility: The Prospect of Expert Robots, in ROBOT LAW 102, 
117–24 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016). 
37 Lisa A. Shay et. al., Confronting Automated Law Enforcement, in
ROBOT LAW 235, 239 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016) (“We define 
automated law enforcement as any computer-based system that uses 
input from unattended sensors to algorithmically determine that a 
crime has been, or is about to be, committed and then takes some 
responsive action, such as to prevent the crime, to inform the 
appropriate law-enforcement agency or to impose some form of 
punishment.”). 
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machine vested with a sense-think-act cycle.38 He also 
points out that as early as 2004, a Japanese government 
study group of which he was a member had established a 
definition of a robot as something which had sensors 
enabling it to confirm its own status and that of the 
external world as well as the capability to analyze the 
information so obtained and to act accordingly.39
The European Parliament has called for the 
creation of “a common European definition for smart 
autonomous robots,” including appropriate subcategories, 
taking into consideration: 
1. the capacity to acquire autonomy through 
sensors and/or by exchanging data with its 
environment (inter-connectivity) and the 
analysis of those data; 
2. the capacity to learn through experience and 
interaction; 
3. the form of the robot’s physical support; 
4. the capacity to adapt its behavior and actions 
to the environment.40
Yet these considerations merely describe the scope of a 
possible definition rather than serving as a functional one.  
In one of his seminal works on the subject Ryan 
Calo, one of the leading scholars in the field, has (probably 
wisely) avoided defining a robot, while at the same time 
characterizing them as an emergent technology that 
combines “the genitive promiscuity of data with the 
38 Hirano, supra note 2, at 55.  
39 Id. at 67.  
40 Motion for a European Parliament Resolution with Recommen-
dations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, EUR. PARL.
DOC. PV 14 (2015); Annex to the Motion for a Resolution: Detailed 
Recommendations as to the Content of the Proposal Requested, EUR.
PARL. DOC. PV 14 (2015). 
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capability to physical harm.” With this definition he 
suggests that robotics represent a technology that is 
exceptional enough to invite “a systemic changes to laws 
or legal institutions,”41 which suggests that incremental 
use of analogies from discrete fields of law may be 
inadequate.    
AI is certainly a factor in many definitions of 
robots, with some authors even suggesting that “[w]e may 
be misled if we insist on too sharp a distinction between 
robotics and AI systems.”42 Others have simply defined AI 
as a feature of what constitutes a robot without getting 
into the details.43 Andrea Bertolini describes the quest for 
a definition of a robot as “a pointless exercise.”44
Nothing in this article is intended as criticism of 
these various definitions or their authors. Each definition 
serves the purposes of the arguments and agendas being 
advanced in the writings where they are used. They are, 
however, academic, theoretical definitions. None seems 
likely to serve as something that could be used in 
connection with the development of coherent legal or 
technical rules for actually regulating robots in the real 
world. This would be for the simple reason that it would 
41 Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV.
513, 553 (2015).  
42 Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 45, 
51 (June 2015). 
43 See, e.g., Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of 
Humans 4 (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 27/2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2941001 (“. . . robots are a form of embodied 
AI.”); Maxwell Mehlman, Jessica Wilen Berg, and Soumya Ray, Robot 
Law 1 (Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-1, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2908488 (discussing the subject of robot 
using the undefined term “artificially-intelligent robot.”). 
44  Andrea Bertolini, Robots as Products: The Case for a Realistic 
Analysis of Robotic Applications and Liability Rules, 5 LAW,
INNOVATION & TECH. 214, 217 (2013). 
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usually be unclear whether any particular robot would fit 
whichever definition was being applied.   
II. PROBLEM AS SOLUTION: DEFINITION 
AS A FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE OF 
PRACTICAL ROBOT LAW 
This article approaches the subject of robot law from a 
different perspective: that a fundamental purpose of any 
coherent system of practical robot law should be to provide 
definitions that can be used as a framework for further 
regulation to establish a framework for robotic identity. 
Hard or soft laws defining what is and is not a robot would 
be—should be—the starting point for either applying 
existing rules to those definitions or developing new rules.  
Whatever definitions this practical law of robots 
provides will be unsatisfactory and incomplete; such is the 
nature of legal definitions. Technology systems that have 
many robot-like features, but are not “robots” under 
whatever definitions we establish will invariably be 
excluded. From the outset our system of robot law will 
have to distinguish between those “robots” that fit the 
legal definition and those that don’t.  
This distinction will likely be a good and useful 
thing. Why? Because this very basic definitional boundary 
can be used to establish criteria for robots that make them 
safer and the people who make, own, and use them more 
responsible. Definitional rules can serve as a foundation 
for encouraging the development and use of robots that fit 
the definition and disfavor those that do not.  
Let us look at family law again for examples. The 
law accords numerous advantages—tax benefits, 
inheritance rights, and testimonial privileges to family 
relationships, particularly spousal ones.45 The same sorts 
45 See, e.g. CAL. EVID. CODE § 970 (1967); 26 U.S.C. § 2523 (2012); FLA.
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of rules could be developed to favor particular types of 
robots: Fourth Amendment (or comparable) protections 
could be accorded to sensitive video and voice recordings 
stored in home companion robots, but only if they fit our 
definition. Taxing robots (or their transactions) differently 
depending on whether they fit our definition would be 
another obvious possibility.  
There are also analogies we could apply from other 
areas of law. We could impose negligence liability for torts 
caused by robots meeting our definition, and strict 
liability on those caused by anything else.46 Who should 
bear this liability is another question, but one for which 
definition will at least help us develop answers.  
Whether the examples given above would be 
appropriate rules is open to debate. However, they should 
at least illustrate why none of the definitions given above 
would be particularly helpful in figuring out what sort of 
rules to apply.  
One simple way of establishing a definitional 
“robot/not-robot” dichotomy (though the distinction need 
not be dichotomous in practice), would be through a 
registration system. Technology systems that are 
registered in the system would be capital “R” Robots; those 
that are not would be mere drones, Roombas, hobbyist 
toys or other lower-case (and lower-caste) “robots.”  
STAT. §§ 732.201–732.228 (2016). 
46 Some may object that such rules would discourage innovation in 
the “robot” space. See, Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571, 
596–601 (2011) (discussing the implications of tort liability on robotic 
innovation). Such objections will unlikely be supported by empirical 
evidence, and more likely it will just mean innovation will take place 
subject to a known, higher risk profile. In any case, to transpose what 
parents say about fun to children brandishing pointy sticks, “it’s only 
innovation until someone loses an eye.” The difference, of course, is 
that with innovation in areas such as robots, the person losing the eye 
is unlikely to be the person doing the innovation.   
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The devil would be in the details, of course, and 
much of the real definitional functioning of the rules 
would come through the registration protocols. These 
would be the technical, informational, legal and other 
parameters that must be satisfied in order to register a 
Robot (and maintain such registration), as well as the 
rules by which other systems (technological, 
administrative or others) interact with that registry. This 
subject will be addressed later.  
Registering things as part of a system of rules is 
hardly a new idea. Most readers will likely think of land, 
motor vehicle, animal and corporate registries. However, 
these may not be ideal cognates. Real estate does not move 
and corporations don’t really exist. Robots do both. Motor 
vehicles exist and move but usually only through human 
agency (or product defects). As previously noted, most of 
the “robots” discussed in the context of robot law are 
expected to be capable of independent decisions and 
motion, and are thus capable of taking actions that impact 
the real world without any decisions or input from human 
beings.
Similarly, many jurisdictions require dogs (and/or 
other animals) to be registered. But everyone already 
knows what a dog is, so it does not involve any definitional 
complexity. By contrast, the definition of “robot” is a 
fundamental issue, and one that a robot registration 
system would (should!) seek to address.  
Nor do existing registry systems offer a 
comprehensive system of regulation or involve the high 
level of technical sophistication that, given their nature, 
should be a part of a robot registry system. Unregistered 
automobiles can still be driven on roads and enter parking 
structures, registration of land title does not itself prevent 
trespass or adverse possession or identify who actually 
does things on it.  
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While registry systems may identify who owns or 
is notionally responsible for whatever is registered, the 
owner of a registered vehicle is unlikely to be responsible 
if someone else has an accident while driving it, and 
corporations seem to have evolved so as to deliberately 
obfuscate who is actually responsible for most of its 
behavior. In other words, other than corporate registries 
which at least identify corporations as having a separate 
legal status and notionally responsible directors, existing 
registration systems do not address the issue of 
independent agency or capacity, two of the key features of 
robots that generate much of the discourse introduced 
earlier in this article.  
The European Parliament has recommended the 
creation of a centrally-administered system of registration 
for “smart robots” (whatever that means):  
For the purposes of traceability 
and in order to facilitate the 
implementation of further 
recommendations, a system of 
registration of advanced robots 
should be introduced, based on the 
criteria established for the 
classification of robots. The system 
of registration and the register 
should be Union-wide, covering 
the internal market, and could be 
managed by a designated EU 
Agency for Robotics and Artificial 
Intelligence in case such an 
Agency is created.47
This system is fine as far as it goes, but does it go far 
47 Annex to the Motion for a Resolution, supra note 40. 
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enough? It is not clear that this recommendation 
envisions anything beyond something derived from 
existing registration systems for corporations, vehicles, or 
other forms of property. Nor does it indicate whether the 
“criteria” for registration will be anything other than 
broad guidelines.   
Let us now return to a subject introduced earlier, 
the potential for family law to provide a useful source of 
rules that could be applied to robots. Here we should do so 
in the context of the registration system. However, in the 
common law system there is no comprehensive system of 
registering families, only what might be called an event-
based system of certifying discrete family “transactions,” 
that affect personal and family status: births, deaths, 
marriages, divorces, adoptions and so forth.  
Japan, however, has a well-established and 
comprehensive system of family registration that may 
offer a more useful model, one that that has been 
functioning in the real world for over the century. The 
next section will give a brief summary of the key aspects 
of this system. It will also illustrate why the Japanese 
system offers a number of useful possible analogies to use 
in developing a system of robotic registration. Just as the 
Japanese family registration system historically 
functioned as part of the foundation of the civil law and 
government infrastructure in Japan, a robotic registration 
system could provide a similar foundational role for a 
comprehensive system of robot law.48
48 This is also the appropriate juncture to point out that Japan has 
its own literary “law of robots,” in the form of the Robot Law 
introduced in Tetsuwan Atomu, the classic cartoon by Tezuka Osamu 
and known in translation as “Astro Boy.” Roughly translated, 
Tezuka’s law consists of the following rules: (1) robots may not hurt 
or kill humans; (2) robots are born to serve humans; (3) robots can 
make anything except money; (4) robots may not go abroad without 
permission; (5) male and female robots may not interchange 
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themselves; (6) robots may not change their own faces without 
permission; (7) a robot created as a robot may not become a child 
robot; (8) a robot dismantled by humans may not be put together by 
another robot; (9) robots may not destroy human homes or property; 
and (10) a robot must call the human who made it “father.” The 
gendered and paternalistic aspects of these rules may seem quaint; 
one should bear in mind that they appear in a fictional world 
populated by robots in a children’s comic written decades ago. 
Nonetheless, insofar as some of them are focused on robot identity,
the author would suggest they reflect a conceptualization of robot law 
that is in some ways more relevant to real world than Asimov’s.  
Tezuka Osamu, Aokish [The Blue Knight], 15 TETSUWAN ATOMU 7, 15-
16 (1981).     
Outside the world of fictional Japanese robot law, in 2015 Kei?
University’s Professor Fumio Shinpo proposed eight precept of robot 
law. Roughly summarized and translated, these were: (1) humanity 
first (robots may not harm or become people); (2) obedience to order 
(they must follow human orders and must be subject to control); (3) 
secrecy and privacy (robots must preserve the secrecy of information 
they gather and be designed accordingly, with reference to OECD 
guidelines); (4) use limitation (robots must be limited to their 
intended use and may not be used to harm humans); (5) security 
safeguards; (6) openness & transparency (there must be visibility in 
the design and use of robots); (7) individual participation (individuals 
must participate in the creation of rules governing robots, and robots 
must not govern individuals); and (8) accountability (there must be 
rules of liability for harm caused by robots). Fumio Shinpo, Roboto h?
wo meguru h?ry?iki betsu kadai no ch?kan [A bird’s eye view of robot 
law issues by legal field], 1 J?h? h?sei kenky? 64, 74-75 (2017). See 
Colin P.A. Jones, Robot Rights: From Asimov to Tezuka, JAPAN TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2019/03/06/ 
issues/robot-rights-asimov-tezuka/#.XIFAy5NKiL8.  
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III. FAMILY LAW FOR OTHER PEOPLE: 
JAPAN’S KOSEKI FAMILY 
REGISTRATION SYSTEM 
A. Overview 
Japan’s system of formal family law can confound 
Western observers who may be tempted to attribute its 
functioning primarily to vague notions like “culture” or 
“tradition.” In fact, all Japanese family law as exists today 
only dates back as far as the Civil Code of 1896 which was 
in fact heavily influenced by continental European models 
at the time, and then further impacted by American-
driven amendments to the Code in 1947, during the post-
war occupation.49 In many ways Japanese family customs 
and norms of an older vintage were forced to fit into the 
constraints of this more modern law.50
 A more immediate explanation of why Japanese 
family law seems strange and alien may be due to the 
nation essentially having two interlinked systems of 
family law: one public, and one private. What most people 
associate with substantive family law—how people get 
married, divorced, adopt, fight over estate and marital 
property, decide custody of the children and so forth—can 
be found in Part IV of the Civil Code (and Part V, as to 
inheritance) and court practice. 51  To the extent it is 
primarily concerned with the private law rights and 
duties between persons within the context of family 
49 See COLIN P.A. JONES & FRANK S. RAVITCH, THE JAPANESE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 29–38 (2018).  
50 See Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki Registry 




51 MINP? [CIV. C.] arts. 739–71, 859–82 (Japan). 
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relationships, this system could be described as “family 
law for family members.”  
Most of the things people fight over in family 
court—who the children live with, visitation, child 
support and so forth—may seem important to those doing 
the fighting, but for the most part do not (or should not) 
affect the rights and duties of third parties. The universe 
of changes in family status that potentially affect third 
parties is not large: divorce which terminates spousal joint 
liability for debts and terminates joint property rights, for 
example, and post-divorce allocations of parental 
authority is relevant to anyone who deals with a child 
through the parent having it. Such changes do not 
necessarily need to be accomplished through courts; the 
principal requirement of third parties as to the family is 
identifying who comprises it.      
 The second system of Japanese family law is thus 
essentially “family law for everyone else.” In other words, 
its primary purpose can be seen as to unambiguously 
authenticate the existence (or absence) of those family 
relationships that could potentially affect third parties, 
whether through claims on property, the ability to 
repudiate contracts made by other family members, joint 
liability for debts, authority to deal on behalf of a minor 
child and so forth.  
 This latter system of family law is based primarily 
on a registration system known as the koseki—the Family 
Register—and governed by the Family Register Act.52 On 
a national level, the koseki system falls under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice, but day-to-day 
administration is left to municipal authorities.53
52 Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, translated in 
(Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselawtrans 
lation.go.jp (Japan).  
53 Id. arts. 1–3.  
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 Article 6 of the Family Register Act illustrates the 
basic purpose and parameters of the koseki system: 
A family register shall be created 
for each unit consisting of a 
husband and wife, and any children 
thereof with the same surname, 
who have their registered domicile 
within the area of a municipality; 
provided, however, that when a new 
family register is created for a 
person who has entered into 
marriage with a person who is not a 
Japanese national (hereinafter 
referred to as a "foreign national"), 
or for a person who does not have a 
spouse, it shall be created for each 
unit consisting of such person and 
any children thereof with the same 
surname.54
This language illustrates two features of the koseki
system that make it a particularly useful model for a robot 
registration system—a Robot Koseki.  
First, just as what we have proposed should be a 
basic feature of a system for robots, the koseki provides a 
very basic and binary definitional framework based on
nationality. Only Japanese people have koseki
registrations. To be registered in a koseki means you are 
Japanese. Japanese nationals have koseki registrations 
and since Japanese nationality is transmitted through 
parentage rather than place of birth (with some minor 
exceptions), being registered in the koseki as the natural 
child of a Japanese parent means you must also be 
54 Id. art. 6. 
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Japanese.55 Non-Japanese cannot register a koseki unless 
they acquire Japanese citizenship through naturalization, 
a process which requires abandoning other nationalities.56
On a very basic level, therefore, the system is 
inherently binary, and makes it easy to create and 
implement rules based on a simple Japanese/Not-
Japanese distinction. As is suggested by the latter half of 
article 6 of the Family Register Act, Japanese family law 
distinguishes in a basic different way in situations 
involving foreigners, who only show up as marginal 
notations in the koseki of a Japanese spouse or child. Some 
might call this discrimination, but the starting point is 
that foreign family members do not have koseki and 
therefore must be treated differently.  
With the appearance of the word “discrimination,” 
it is important to be clear that nothing in this article is 
intended to praise the koseki as part of a system of 
regulating human families or discrimination. As the 
discussion that follows will show it has (or, in prior 
iterations had) numerous aspects that could be considered 
deleterious to them. However, many of the features that 
might make it seem an unsuitable system for some 
humans, are precisely those features that would be 
desirable in a system for robots. “Discrimination” is the 
55 See Kokusekih? [Nationality Act], Law No. 147 of 1950, art. 2, 
translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www. 
japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan). More complex rules exist for 
children born out of wedlock to Japanese fathers and non-Japanese 
children adopted by Japanese parents. See id. arts. 3, 8 paras. (i)–(ii). 
56 See id. arts. 5–9. Japan’s Nationality Act does not permit Japanese 
adults to have dual nationality, and losing Japanese nationality 
means removal from the koseki system. See id. arts. 11, 14. See also
Kosekih? Shik?kisoku [Ordinance for Enforcement of the Family 
Register Act], Law No. 94 of 1947, art. 35(xii), art. 39(vii), translated 
in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www.japaneselaw 
translation.go.jp (Japan). 
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first such feature, since we want our system to favor and 
encourage the development of and registration of robots 
that satisfy the registration criteria, and discourage the 
development of those that do not.   
 The second key feature of the Japanese koseki
illustrated by Article 6 of the Family Register Act is that 
the basic unit of registration is the family rather than the 
individual, making it fundamentally collective enterprise. 
Under the Japanese system, the two events which render 
the creation of a new koseki mandatory involve at least 
two people: marriage or the birth of a child out of 
wedlock. 57  The Civil Code requirement that legally-
married spouses share the same surname (which is 
registered in the koseki) is similarly indicative of the role 
of the koseki in treating a collective as a single unit.58
B. Historical Context 
When it was first introduced shortly after the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868 during a period when Japan had to 
rapidly modernize in order to address the threat of 
Western colonization, the koseki system performed a 
number of important governance functions. Originally 
tied to the location of the family residence, it operated as 
57 See Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 6, 
translated in (Japanese Law Translation [JLT DS]), http://www. 
japaneselawtranslation.go.jp (Japan). Although it is possible for a 
child who has reached adulthood to establish a registration separate 
from his or her parents, this is not required and it is not uncommon 
to remain on the parental koseki until marriage. Family Register Act, 
art. 100.   
58 See MINP? [CIV. C.] art. 750, (Japan) (requiring couples registering 
a marriage to share the same surname, either the husband’s or the 
wife’s). Article 790(1) imposes the same requirement as to children of 
the marriage, id. art. 790, para. 1, while article 790(2) mandates a 
child born out of wedlock take the surname of his/mother, id. art. 790, 
para. 2. 
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part of a surveillance system that facilitated keeping track 
of who was from where and related to whom (this might 
be a desirable functionality for a robot koseki system as 
well).59
Registration systems had existed in Japan prior to 
the Meiji Restoration but were localized within the 
individual feudal domains that comprised the nation at 
the time. Movement between these domains had been 
tightly controlled. The breakdown of the social and 
political order that characterized the years before the 
Restoration saw numerous people leaving their domains 
and effectively becoming untraceable.60
 At the same time as this domestic unrest, Japan 
faced the related threat of colonization by the foreign 
powers who were coming to live and trade in Japan thanks 
to the treaty rights wrested from Japan’s reluctant feudal 
leaders by American Commodore Matthew Perry in 1954. 
The introduction of a nationwide koseki system was thus 
critical for a number of reasons, not only to forge a new 
unified “Japanese” identity, but also to provide its new 
national government basic demographic information 
about the Japanese people. Such information was critical 
to formulate and implement national policies such as 
taxation and conscription.61
The initial koseki system adopted by the Meiji 
59 For the discussion in this section I have relied heavily on the 
wonderfully useful book by Professor End?. See generally MASATAKA 
END?, KOSEKI TO KOKUSEKI NO KINGENDAISHI: MINZOKU KETT?
NIHONJIN [A RECENT AND MODERN HISTORY OF FAMILY REGISTRATION 
AND NATIONALITY] (2013). Those not able to read Japanese may find 
Chapman and Krogness’ edited volume equally useful. See generally
DAVID CHAPMAN & KARL JAKOB KROGNESS, JAPAN’S HOUSEHOLD 
REGISTRATION SYSTEM AND CITIZENSHIP: KOSEKI IDENTIFICATION AND 
DOCUMENTATION (2014). 
60 See, End?, supra note 59 at 107–30.  
61 Id.
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government was a failure and came to be replaced by the 
system adopted in conjunction with the Civil Code of 1896, 
which contained what became the basic rules of Japanese 
family law.62 The collectivist nature of the koseki was 
more pronounced under this system until its reform 
during the post-war occupation. “Families” under this 
system might consist of three or four generations and 
multiple married couples being registered in a single 
koseki.
These families had a registered koshu or “head of 
household.” This was a legal, heritable status 
accompanied by numerous rights, authorities and duties, 
including the duty to support members of the household, 
a presumption in favor of family property being attributed 
to him, the right to inherit and dispose of family property 
and control entry into the family through approval of 
marriages by junior members or acceptance into the 
household of children born out of wedlock or members of 
related households, and even the right to control where 
members resided. 63  It was a status that could not be 
freely shed by the person in whom it was vested, unless he 
reached the age of 60 and there was a suitable successor 
available and willing to assume his powers, at which point 
he could retire.64
The head of household enabled the government to 
effectively use the family, rather than the individual, as 
the smallest unit of society subject to governance for many 
purposes. In exchange for allowing heads of household 
broad autonomy in how they managed their family, they 
62 Id. at 125–230. 
63 See Archive of Old Civil Code of Japan, arts. 735, 736, 747, 748, 749, 
750, 955, 986, CORNELL UNIV. L. LIBRARY, https://archive.org/stream/ 
cu31924069576704/cu31924069576704_djvu.txt (last visited Mar. 7, 
2018). 
64 See id. arts. 752, 753. 
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were responsible for helping implement policies such as 
taxation and conscription.  
A historical aspect of the system that is of 
particular interest to our hypothetical robot registration 
system is how the government encouraged—or forced— 
people to register when it was introduced. As suggested 
earlier in the article, this was accomplished by using laws 
and regulations to create incentives to register and 
disadvantages to failing to do so.  
One noteworthy example was—and still is—
marriage and inheritance. Registration of a marriage was 
and is an absolute requirement for the marriage to have 
legal effect. Failure to register a marriage meant that the 
children of the marriage were illegitimate. This was a 
status to which the Civil Code accorded various 
disadvantages, some of which remained into the twenty-
first century.65
Another example was through the linkage with 
nationality. Not being registered in a koseki meant you 
weren’t a member of the “Japanese people” (kokumin), and 
thus not entitled to the privileges and protections that 
came with that status.66 The linkage of nationality to 
65 However, in 2013, the Supreme Court ruled the provision 
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because the Civil Code 
(article 900) accorded lesser inheritance rights to children born out of 
wedlock. See Saik? Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 4, 2013, 67 SAIK?
SAIBANSHO SAIBANREI MINJI HANREISH? [MINSH?] 1320. 
66 As described by one of the leading authorities on the koseki, the 
business of its introduction was “. . . a pivotal national policy: it was 
by posting in the family register that the people [jinmin] were first 
identified as “nationals” [kokumin] and those who were left out did 
not enjoy the protection of the state, emphasizing their exile to outside 
the scope of nationals, and attempting to crate enforceability of 
registration in the family register.” (translation from Japanese by 
Colin Jones). End?, supra note 59, at 121 (2013). See also CHAPMAN,
supra note 59, at 146–65. Notwithstanding the numerous 
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constitutional protection remains a part of Japanese law 
today.67
Under the pre-1947 system, citizenship was also a 
family affair. Marrying a Japanese person meant either 
entering the Japanese spouse’s koseki and acquiring 
Japanese nationality or leaving the koseki and losing it.68
Citizenship was also tied up with colonialism. 
Japan’s acquisition of a colonial empire meant addressing 
existing registry systems in Taiwan and Korea which 
were based on very different systems of family law than 
Japan.69 These were left in place and essentially the same 
rules as applied to marrying foreigners applied: marrying 
a Korean meant either the Japanese spouse either became 
“Korean” (by the Japanese spouse entering the Korean 
koseki) or the reverse. This system enabled colonial Japan 
to develop different forms of citizenship within its empire 
based on koseki registrations. Someone registered in a 
disadvantages to not registering in the koseki, it is estimated that 
every year approximately 3,000 children born in Japan are not 
registered and may even reach adulthood while suffering the 
tremendous disadvantages of being “bureaucratically, 
administratively and legally invisible” for that reason. David 
Chapman, The Invisible Japanese, EAST ASIA F. (Aug. 13, 2017), 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/08/13/the-invisible-japanese/. 
67  Note while not apparent from the English version of the 
constitution, Chapter III of which enumerates the rights of “the 
people,” the Japanese version uses the term “kokumin,” which clearly 
refers to Japanese nationals. Japan’s Supreme Court has thus had to 
develop jurisdiction as to the degree to which non-Japanese enjoy 
constitutional protections. E.g., Saik? Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 
1978, 32 SAIK? SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISH? [MINSH?] 1223. In a 
2008 decision the Supreme Court of Japan confirmed that Japanese 
citizenship is “an important legal status that means a lot to people in 
order to enjoy the guarantee of fundamental human rights . . . .” Saik?
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 4, 2008, 62 SAIK? SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISH? [MINSH?] 1367. 
68 CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 83. 
69 Id. at 101-104.
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Korean koseki would not have the same freedom to come 
to the Japanese islands or enjoy the same political rights 
as someone registered in a Japanese koseki. 70  Again, 
such a system would likely seem deplorable if applied to 
humans today, but offers some possibly useful analogies 
for how overlapping robotic registration systems could be 
used.71
Another noteworthy historical aspect of the 
system is that koseki records used to be essentially public 
documents. From the 1890s the koseki system was 
designed so that the family records of everyone were 
accessible to other members of the general public (subject 
to payment of the relevant fees).72 This was said to make 
it possible to confirm that a contract counterparty was not 
a minor or subject to other capacity restraints, a fiancée 
was not married or to address a myriad of other situations 
where it might be useful for one private person to confirm 
the identity, status or family composition of another.73
It was not until 1976 that the first restrictions on 
access to koseki records were imposed, with an 
amendment to the Family Register Act prohibiting access 
to koseki records for “improper purposes.” 74  2008 
70 See id. at 228 (Japan’s former colonial subjects lost their Japanese 
citizenship based on an interpretive directive from the MOJ stating 
that those registered in Korean or Taiwanese registries at the time 
the Treaty of San Francisco took effect in 1952 (and which stripped 
Japan of its territories) would no longer be Japanese. This would have 
included ethnic Japanese who married into Korean or Taiwanese 
families, but excluded Koreans and Taiwanese who married into 
Japanese ones).  
71 See CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 115-17 (for an extremely useful 
description in Japanese of the colonial registration and nationality 
systems of pre-war Japan). 
72 Id. at 148-49. 
73 Id.
74 Id. at 181, 184.  
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amendments to the Family Register Act finally saw it 
converted to a non-public system, with stringent 
restrictions on third party access imposed for the first 
time. 75  This came four years after Japan passed the 
Personal Information Protection Act which essentially 
recognized data privacy as a basic human right.76 Some 
legal professions still have statutory rights to request 
koseki information from the authorities if they have an 
appropriate reason for doing so.77
One final historical note is that the koseki system 
used to disclose more information about the registered 
family and its individual members than it does now. 
Information that was once recorded in the koseki includes 
noble status, prior samurai status, birth out of wedlock, 
being an abandoned child, birth or death in a sanatorium 
or prison, roots in burakumin “untouchable” communities 
and criminal records. 78  Until the 2000 amendments, 
being subject to a declaration of incompetence or 
guardianship was also recorded in the koseki.79
In short, therefore, the koseki system historically 
enabled both the government and other third parties to 
identify a unit known as the “family” and confirm its 
75 Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, arts. 10, 10-
2 (Japan). 
76 Geren Ziliao Baohufa [Personal Information Protection Act], art. 1 
(Japan). 
77 CHAPMAN, supra note 59, at 181, 184. 
78  Karl Jakob Krogness, Jus Koseki: Household Registration and 
Japanese Citizenship, 12 ASIA PAC. J. JAPAN FOCUS 5-6, 8, 9, n.23 
(2014) (reviewing CHAPMAN & KROGNESS, supra note 59).  
79 See Tokyo Legal Affairs Bureau, (2015), http://houmukyoku. 
moj.go.jp/tokyo/static/shoumei_mihon.html (stating that present 
guardianship arrangements are registered in a separate registry 
maintained by Legal Affairs Bureaus under the Ministry of Justice. 
Instead of a koseki extract one can prove that one is not subject to any 
capacity restraints through issuance of a “not being registered” 
certificate from this Legal Affairs Bureau). 
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members and various known legal attributes that accrued 
to such status. Through the system it was possible to 
confirm that someone was Japanese and who might be 
responsible for the behavior of an individual family 
member, or empowered to deal on the family’s behalf.     
C. The Koseki System Today 
The “head of household” status was inconsistent with the 
equal protection guarantees and individualistic focus of 
Japan’s postwar Constitution and was abolished during 
the post-war occupation Civil Code reforms.80 However, 
the current system of family law and koseki registration is 
still essentially collective. As already noted, new 
registrations are triggered by marriage or births. 81
80 See e.g., ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A
PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK, 111-20 (1976); Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications (2017), http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-
news/110614_00001.html#kekkahoukou (reporting results of the 
survey that reconsiders application procedures, with a focus on 
procedures requiring the submission of family register extracts).  
81 MINP? (CIV. C.) art. 750; JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 49, at 299-
300. See also Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki 
Registry System Looks Ever More Outdated, JAPAN TIMES (July 10, 
2016), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/07/10/issues/ja 
pans-discriminatory-koseki-registry-system-looks-ever-outdated/#.X 
Eodg_ZFxPY; Mikihiko Wada, Abolition of the House (ie) Under the 
Occupation – Or the Two Faces of Koseki: A Janus, 26 L. JAPAN 99, 
104 (2000) (stating that many aspects of the current family law 
system likely seem quirky and counterintuitive even to some 
Japanese people. This is because it represents an occupation-era 
compromise between the Americans overseeing the transformation of 
Japanese laws and institutions and their Japanese government 
counterparts. The Americans wanted an individual-based 
registration system while the Japanese did not. The Americans 
compromised in accepting a collectivist registration system, but only 
so long as it did not permit registration of more than two generations 
to be registered in it. This explains why women having a child out of 
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Similarly, the Civil Code rules still theoretically make it 
possible to attribute rights and responsibilities to family 
members based on their registration status. 
Today, births, deaths, disappearances, marriages, 
divorces, adoptions (and their dissolutions), acquisition or 
loss of Japanese nationality, legal name changes, formal 
disinheritance of a presumptive heir, and changes of 
gender are still recorded in the koseki.82 Other than birth 
and death, of course, many changes of status—marriage, 
consensual divorce, some adoptions and the consensual 
dissolution of those adoptive relationships—and can be 
accomplished merely by filing the necessary paperwork 
with the local authorities.83 Others—some (but not all) 
adoptions of minors and changes of gender, for example—
require involvement of a family court but only in a 
ministerial oversight role, with the result being registered 
in the koseki.84
wedlock must separate herself from her parents’ registry, and why 
whether a woman can return to her parents’ registry after the 
termination of a marriage is dependent on whether she has parental 
authority of the child of the marriage or not). 
82 Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, arts. 20–4, 
49–59, 66–69-2, 70–73-2, 76–77-2, 86–94, 97, 102–106, 107–107-2 
(Japan). 
83 For marriage: see MINP? (CIV. C.) art. 739 and Kosekih? [Family 
Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 74, (Japan); for divorce: see
MINP? (CIV. C.) art. 764 and Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 
224 of 1947, art. 76, (Japan); for adoptions: see MINP? (CIV. C.) art. 
799 and Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1974, art. 66, 
(Japan); for dissolution of adoption: see MINP? (CIV. C.) art. 812 and 
Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1974, art. 70, (Japan). 
84 MINP? (CIV. C.) arts. 798 and 817-2; Seid?itsu sh?gaisha no 
seibetsu no toriatukai no tokurei ni kansuru h?ritsu [Act on Special 
Cases in Handling Gender Status for Persons with Gender Identity 
Disorder], Law No. 111 of 2003 (Japan). For example, same-sex 
marriages are not currently recognized. Courts have developed well-
established rules and practices for dealing with the rights of parties 
in de facto marriages (for example), based on other provisions of the 
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The koseki system makes Japan one of the easiest 
countries in the world to get a mutually consensual 
divorce; there is no residence requirement or need to go to 
court—or even be in Japan.85 The divorce can be procured 
merely by submitting a confirming divorce notification 
with the registration authorities. Allocation of parental 
authority over minor children to a single parent post-
divorce is mandatory, but can also be accomplished simply 
by filing the koseki paperwork. 86  Litigation over the 
operation of the koseki system falls primarily into the 
sphere of administrative law and involves issues such as 
registry authorities refusing to accept registrations in 
unusual situations, or parties challenging the registration 
requirements.87
Civil Code such as those dealing with tort, contract and the Japanese 
equivalent of equitable principles. Thus, such relationships don’t exist 
outside the protections of the law; but they do exist outside of the 
koseki system and are thus less significant to the rest of the world, 
and are enjoying increasing recognition in the public sphere). See, e.g. 
Sapporo First Major City in Japan to Issue Certificates Recognizing 
Same-Sex Couples, JAPAN TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www. 
japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/01/national/sapporo-first-major-city-
japan-issue-certificates-recognizing-sex-couples/#.W2JefTn8lrQ 
(showing that some municipalities have started to issue certificates 
recognizing same-sex couples, though doing so has largely symbolic 
value other than in connection with commercial services: “These 
documents do not confer legal rights or obligations, but enable them 
to become recipients of life insurance money and use family-member 
discounts for mobile phone and other services.”).
85  Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1974, art. 40 
(Japan) (allowing Japanese nationals living abroad to make koseki
filings through their local embassy or consulate). 
86 MINP? (CIV. C.) art. 819(1); Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law 
No. 224 of 1974, art. 76 (Japan). 
87 Perhaps the most famous example is that of a parent who sought 
to register his newborn child under the name of “devil” (akuma) and 
brought suit when the register authority refused to accept it. Tokyo 
Kateisaibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Jun. 1, 1994, Hachiouji Shibu, 1486 
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 The Civil Code and Family Register Act remain 
closely interlinked, with the former providing the rules by 
which people can enter into and terminate the 
relationships registered in the latter. The family 
relationships that can be reflected in the koseki are only 
those provided for in the Civil Code. For changes in status 
such as marriage, divorce, some adoptions, and the 
dissolution of those adoptive relationships, registration is 
what gives them legal effect. 88  Court resolution of 
disputes that would affect a koseki registration and thus 
third parties (e.g., divorce, dissolution of adoptive 
relationships, changes in allocation of parental authority) 
represent only a small subset of the matters family courts 
deal with, and the court-sponsored conciliation process is 
designed to filter out as many cases as possible before the 
court must resolve any through formal litigation (which, 
at risk of repetition, is not required in the first place). 
Historically, around 90% of divorces have been 
accomplished through koseki filings.89 The small minority 
HANREI TAIMUZU 56 (Japan). See also Sam Jameson, In Japan, 
Parents Play Devil's Advocate in Naming Child, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-01-15/news/mn-12064_1_boy-
named-sue. 
88 See, e.g., MINP? (CIV. C.) art. 739(1) (Japan) (“Marriage shall take 
effect upon notification pursuant to the Family Registration Act. . . .”). 
89 See MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE, OVERVIEW OF 
VITAL STATISTICS (2017), https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/ 
jinkou/kakutei17/index.html (according to Japanese government 
statistics, in 2015, 87.6% of divorces were achieved through koseki
filings and thus consensual. The remainder were resolved through 
family courts, but even the majority of these through court-sponsored 
conciliation or settlements. Only a little over 1% of divorces were 
judicial divorces, with the change of status resulting from final 
judicial action rather than the out of court agreement of parties. This 
represents a slight decline from the previous decade, with consensual 
divorces accounting for 87.8% of divorces in 2008, 91.2% in 1998, and 
95.5% in 1950. Common lawyers accustomed to a system where even 
consensual divorces must be accomplished through court proceedings 
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of cases in which the courts play any role are resolved 
through conciliation; only about 1% of Japanese divorces 
are the result of judicial action.90
The koseki also functions in a code-like fashion in 
that it prevents prohibited changes of status from 
occurring in the first place through the parameters built 
into the system. Bigamy is a crime in Japan, 91 but it is 
also one that is almost impossible for Japanese people to 
commit since registry authorities would not accept a 
marriage registration filed by a couple whose koseki
records showed one of them still married to someone else. 
The same is true of other prohibitions on marriage.92 This 
aspect of the system has caused problems in specific cases, 
including transgender individuals seeking to register 
themselves as the fathers of children born using donor 
sperm when their registry reveals them to originally have 
been registered as female,93 biological parents seeking to 
register children born to surrogate mothers abroad,94 and 
mothers or children seeking to use DNA evidence to rebut 
the presumptions of paternity imposed by the Civil Code 
(article 772) that would result in children being born 
are particularly likely to find a discussion of Japanese family law that 
focuses on what Japanese courts do may thus find the system both 
familiar yet alien). 
90 Id.   
91 KEIH? [PEN. C.], art. 184 (Japan). Bigamy is also proscribed by
MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 732 (Japan). 
92 MINP? (CIV. C.), arts. 731, 733(1), 734–736, (Japan) (including 
marriages by men under 18 or women under 16, marriages to family 
members (including adoptive) within a certain degree of affinity, and 
marriages by women within 100 days of the dissolution of a prior 
marriage). 
93 Saik? Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 10, 2013, no. 5, 67 SAIK?
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISH? [MINSH?] 1847 (Japan). 
94  Saik? Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 23, 2007, no. 47, 61 SAIK?
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISH? [MINSH?] 619 (Japan). 
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during or even after a marriage being registered as the 
child of the husband.95
Similarly, the koseki maintains its own integrity 
by rejecting filings that do not satisfy its requirements. 
For example, the form used to report births for 
registration in the koseki must still be filed with a 
denotation of whether the child was born in or out of 
wedlock. In 2013 the Supreme Court upheld a registry 
authority’s rejection of a registration from parents who 
refused to check the relevant box on the reporting form.96
D. The Attributes and Uses of Koseki 
Registration Information
The rules of these two interlocked systems of family law 
are unambiguous and often binary in a computer code-like 
fashion. Parties are legally married or they aren’t. Having 
an elaborate wedding ceremony in front of a crowd of 
friends and family, exchanging marital vows before a 
suitable religious figure, and even having children may 
give rise to rights and liabilities under tort or contract, 
and possibly even recognition as a de facto marriage for 
the purpose of some benefits programs, but will never be 
a legal marriage unless it is registered in the koseki.97
95 This result was achieved through a trio of judgments issued on the 
same date by the same petty bench. SAIKO SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.], 1st
Petty Bench, Jul. 17, 2014, 61 SAIK? SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISH?
619 (no case reporter citation); SAIKO SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.], 1st Petty 
Bench, Jul. 17, 2014, 247 SAIK? SAIBANSHO SAIBANSH?MINJI 79; and 
SAIKO SAIBANSHO [Sup. Ct.], 1st Petty Bench, Jul. 17, 2014, 68 SAIK?
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISH? 547. For a discussion, see Shigenori 
Matsui, Never Had a Choice and Have No Power to Alter: Illegitimate 
Children and the Supreme Court of Japan, 44 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
577, n.46 (2016).
96  Saik? Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 26, 2013, no. 399, 67 SAIK?
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISH? [MINSH?] 1384 (Japan). 
97 See, e.g., Colin P.A. Jones, Japan’s Discriminatory Koseki Registry 
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Rigid rules also apply to other family members 
and their registration. Children are born out of wedlock or 
they are not. Children born within 200 days of and 
thereafter during the marriage are presumed (and 
registered as) the child of the husband, as are children 
born within 300 days of its termination, regardless of what 
DNA tests reveal.98 Children’s names must be derived 
from the government-approved set of ideographs.99 Lineal 
System Looks Even More Outdated, JAPAN TIMES (July 10, 2016), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2016/07/10/issues/japans-
discriminatory-koseki-registry-system-looks-ever-outdated/#.WzWv4 
fX8lrQ (since, as in other countries, marriages were entered into on 
the assumption they would result in children, it became a common 
practice to have a wedding ceremony but defer actual registration of 
the marriage until the wife became pregnant. This practice survived 
well into the post-war period, as is illustrated by the 1966 crash of an 
All Nippon Airways flight from Osaka to Matsuyama which resulted 
in the death of all on board. The dead included 12 newlywed couples 
embarking on what had become the newly-fashionable custom of 
taking a honeymoon. However, it transpired that not a single one of 
the marriages had been registered, meaning that there was no legal 
family relationship between them, a fact that reportedly made 
compensation negotiations with the airline more complicated). 
98 See Colin P.A. Jones, Nineteenth Century Rules Over Twenty-First 
Century Reality: Legal Parentage Under Japanese Law, 49 FAMILY L.
QUART. 149, 159-66 (2015) (discussing a trio of 2014 cases the 
Supreme Court of Japan rejected efforts by mothers and children to 
use conclusive DNA evidence to rebut paternity over the objections of 
ex- or estranged husbands). See also MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 772 (Japan) 
(stating only the husband has the statutory authority to rebut the 
presumption of paternity of children and must do so within one year 
of knowing of the child’s birth); MINP? (CIV. C.), arts. 774 & 777 
(Japan). 
99 Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 50, para. 
1 (Japan) (“For the given name of a child, characters that are simple 
and in common use shall be used.”); Kosekih? [Family Register Act], 
Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 50, para. 2 (Japan) (“The scope of characters 
that are simple and in common use shall be defined by Ordinance of 
the Ministry of Justice.”). 
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relatives by blood and siblings within a degree of affinity 
defined through the koseki have a statutory duty of 
mutual support,100 and so forth. 
The rigidity of the Civil Code rules means that, for 
example, the locus of legal parental authority over (and 
thus responsibility for) a minor child is never ambiguous 
and can be verified through the koseki. Parental authority 
over children born out of wedlock vests in the mother by 
default. 101  Children of married parents are under the 
joint parental authority of both parents, and a provision 
of the Civil Code specifically protects third parties from 
conflicting exercises of such authority.102  After divorce 
only one parent is allowed to have parental authority.103
Those identified as having parental authority are 
presumptively authorized to deal on the child’s behalf, 
permit the child to work, manage his or her property as 
well as having responsibility over care and education,104
or even exercise parental authority over the children of 
the child105 (the age of majority currently being 20).106
100 MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 877, para. 1 (Japan). See also MINP? (CIV. C.),
art. 877, para. 2 (Japan) (if special circumstances apply this duty can 
be extended by a family court to the third degree of affinity, which 
again would be demonstrated through koseki records). 
101 MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 819, para. 4 (Japan). 
102 MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 825 (Japan).  
103 MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 819, paras.1–2 (Japan). 
104 See, e.g., MINP? (CIV. C.), arts. 820, 821, 823, 824 (Japan). 
105 See MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 833 (Japan) (another interesting area 
that does not seem to have been discussed in the robot law literature 
is who should be responsible for robots created by robots; here too 
family law may offer a useful source of analogies). 
106 MINP? (CIV. C.), art. 4 (Japan). At the time of writing, the Diet had 
passed a law to reduce the age of majority to 18 for certain purposes. 
See Japan’s Government Approves Bill that Would Lower Age of 
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The rules for attributing tort liability for minors are more 
complicated, but the locus of parental authority serve as a 
starting point.107
The binary and unambiguous nature of the family 
relationships reflected in the koseki means that that an 
extract of a person’s koseki will usually suffice as proof of 
family relationships that are relevant to third parties. For 
a small fee the appropriate municipal authority can issue 
an extract that serves as up-to-date official proof of a 
person’s personal identity (legal name, gender, date of 
birth, etc.) or a more extensive one showing parentage, 
marital status and children. A translation of a koseki
extract is given later in this article and illustrates the 
principal data fields it contains. The koseki system thus 
plays a key role in not only authenticating identity and 
status of the family registered in it and its constituent 
components, but the legal rights and duties that come 
with registration of the family unit and its individual 
components. The utility of a registry of robots that 
authenticates key attributes of robotic identity is 
hopefully obvious.      
Because it is a unified system and registration of 
most changes in status is what gives them legal effect, a 
koseki extract will show an up-to-date snapshot of the 
legal status of a family that is superior to the “event-based” 
documentation (e.g., birth certificates, marriage 
certificates and divorce decrees) used in places like the 
United States. An American may be able to use a marriage 
certificate to prove they married a certain person on a 
certain date in the past, but would struggle to positively 
prove they were still married to that person today. Such 
107 MINP? (CIV. C.), arts. 712–714 (Japan) (providing the basic rules 
regarding liability for the torts of children and others lacking capacity 
and of those obligated to supervise them). 
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proof would be possible through a koseki extract.108
A copy of the translation of a full family register 
extract that is made available on the US Embassy & 
Consulates in Japan website has been provided on the 
following page for reference.109
108 The system is also superior in also only providing that information 
about the legal status of the family relationship that third parties 
need to know; the status itself. The American practice of using divorce 
or custody decrees as proof of custody rights means that schools, 
passport authorities and other third parties may be routinely 
receiving court documents full of information about the terms of a 
divorce or separation that are irrelevant for their purposes.    
109 Translation Templates, AM. EMBASSY & CONSULATES IN JAPAN,
https://jp.usembassy.gov/u-s-citizen-services/passports/translation-
templates/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2019). 
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An explanation of some of these data fields is necessary. 
First, “Permanent Domicile” is a misleading translation of 
the Japanese term honseki. The koseki originally tied the 
family registered to it to a geographical locus—the 
ancestral home, for example. This is no longer the case, if 
it ever was in reality. As already noted, the actual 
residential arrangements are reflected in a separate 
residence registry, which is becoming more important as 
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a framework for law and government programs, and may 
actually be more reflective of real (as opposed to legal) 
family life for a particular household. 110  While each 
koseki is still tied to a geographic location which, among 
other things, identifies the municipality responsible for its 
administration, it does not need to be the place where one 
resides or even a location physically capable of serving as 
a residence.111 It is also possible to change the location of 
one’s honseki to another location, though this will be 
reflected in the current koseki record, enabling one to 
track back through prior registrations.112
Second, the “householder” (hitt?sha) is a remnant 
of the “head of household” concept and reflects the 
principal that all (Japanese) members of the household 
registered in the koseki must share the same legal 
surname. The householder data field identifies the person 
whose surname is to be shared. This must be decided at 
the time of marriage, and is a requirement framed in 
gender neutral terms but in 98% of marriages the wife 
110 The residence registry is also nationality-neutral in that it also 
includes non-Japanese with residence status. Until 2012, non-
Japanese residents were registered in a separate “alien registration” 
system. See JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 49, at 304; see also Atsushi 
Kodera, Foreigners Urged to Swap Alien Certificates for New Cards 
by July Deadline, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www. 
japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/03/25/national/foreigners-urged-to-swap-
alien-certificates-for-new-cards-by-july-deadline/. 
111 See JONES & RAVITCH, supra note 49 (noting that one of the 
author’s children are presently registered with their Japanese mother 
at their Japanese grandparent’s home, which results in their koseki – 
and Japanese passports - showing their “domicile” (honseki) as being 
a location in Japan where they have never actually lived and that 
hundreds of people reportedly register their honseki at Tokyo 
Disneyland and the famous K?shien baseball stadium). 
112 Some Japanese persons may be reluctant to change their koseki
location since it may create the appearance that they “have something 
to hide.”  
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takes the husband’s surname. 
The remaining data fields are probably self-
explanatory, and would show the names and other 
pertinent details of other members of the family (spouse 
and children, both natural and adopted) registered in the 
koseki as well as parents, making it possible to track back 
through the ancestry of both parties. 
The above reflects the “standard” full koseki
extract. It is also possible to procure an extract showing 
the pertinent details of just an individual member. For 
inheritance or other purposes, it may also be necessary to 
obtain an extract of a koseki that no longer is “active” 
(because all its members have either died or moved to 
other koseki) or of older koseki records that predate their 
reformatting from paper-based to computerized systems 
and other changes based on change of law.113
Unlike family law in the United States, the system 
is not dependent on judicial decisions. Even in the 
minority of cases where a change in status is accomplished 
through litigation, that result is simply reflected in the 
koseki. This has a number of important ramifications that 
may not be immediately obvious to an American lawyer.114
113 See About "Statutory Inheritance Information Certification 
System" MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji05_ 
00284.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (in 2017 the Ministry of Justice 
introduced a “proof of legal heirs” certification that obviated the need 
for heirs to go to title registries clutching a pile of koseki extracts in 
order to retitle a decedent’s property. The certification is still based 
on information derived from the decedent’s koseki records).  
114 Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 116 para. 
1 (Japan) (stating Japan’s Civil Code contains a procedure for 
recognition of foreign judgments); MINJI SOSH?H? [C. CIV. PRO.] 1896, 
art. 118. In the author’s experience, common law judges and lawyers 
dealing with Japan-related family disputes spend an inordinate 
amount of time wondering about whether a divorce or custody decree 
from their jurisdiction will be “recognized” in Japan. This may be an 
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It means the system is freed of the constraints of 
jurisdiction or even geography: Japanese people can get 
married or divorced for Japanese law (koseki) purposes 
from anywhere in the world by filings through their local 
consulate.115 It also means documents produced by courts 
are not generally needed as proof of status, since 
authentication is established through a unified registry 
system. It also means the extracts generated by the 
system are standardized as to format and content, as 
opposed to American-style divorce or custody decrees 
which may vary by court or judge and include case-specific 
details and orders.  
At the risk of trying to sound trendy, the koseki
system also has a “blockchain”-like feature: each koseki
record traces back to a previous koseki record. This 
includes previous registrations in different locations, but 
also those of parents and children. The koseki thus 
establishes a clear “chain of title” in family 
relationships.116 A set of koseki records dating back to a 
decedent’s birth can be used to show that all possible legal 
heirs are present and accounted for; if they all agree to a 
particular disposition of the decedent’s property it is 
important question when it comes to property and other obligations, 
but since the koseki system means that court decrees are never used 
as proof of status—particularly parental authority/legal custody—the 
way they are in common law systems, it may not be as important a 
consideration as they expect. For a Japanese person, the most basic 
issue of a foreign judgment may be whether it will be accepted by 
koseki authorities for purposes of registering a divorce or other change 
of family status achieved abroad. In the first place this will be a 
matter of administrative law and will likely only involve the courts if 
the registry authorities refuse to accept a foreign court order on public 
policy grounds. 
115  Kosekih? [Family Register Act], Law No. 224 of 1947, art. 40 
(Japan). 
116 Mikihiko Wada, Abolition of the House (ie) Under the Occupation—
Or the Two Faces of Koseki: A Janus, 26 L. JAPAN 99, 104 (2000). 
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possible to liquidate bank accounts or re-title land without 
probate or other court proceedings. Similar functionality 
would doubtless be desirable in a robot registration 
system.
E. Summary
The rigidity, discriminatory foundations, and invasions of 
privacy inherent in the koseki system may seem shocking 
to Western readers. Many Japanese people may also 
regard the rules of the Civil Code and the koseki system 
itself as rigid and outdated, particularly the presumptions 
of paternity embedded into both systems which literally 
date back to the nineteenth century and continue to 
bedevil families today.117
However, at risk of repetition, the purpose of this 
article is not to praise the koseki system specifically or 
offer Japanese family law as a model for regulating 
humans. 118  Rather, its goal is to identify some of the 
features of the past and present koseki system which may 
prove useful in developing family law analogies for the 
regulation of robots.   
First, the koseki identifies who is and is not a 
member of legally-significant group (Japanese/Not-
Japanese). Second, it treats (or treated) families as a 
single unit for some regulatory purposes, but one in which 
further rules can be used to allocate rights and 
responsibilities among members constituting—involved 
117 See, e.g., Colin P.A. Jones, Nineteenth Century Rules over Twenty-
First Century Reality–Legal Parentage under Japanese Law, 49
FAMILY L. Q. 149, 149 (2015) (suggesting that Japanese courts are 
struggling to reconcile centuries-old statutory presumptions with 
advances in biomedical technology as well as the changing realities of 
Japanese family life). 
118 See Jones, supra note 50. 
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in the creation of—the registered family unit (husband, 
wife and child; head of household in the past). Third, it 
provides a means by which external parties can 
authenticate the legal attributes—the identity—of the 
family and its members that are potentially relevant to 
deciding how and whether to interact with it. Fourth, it 
provides or provided a means of identifying responsibility 
for the actions of members of the collective, particularly 
where limited capacity is an issue (children, adults 
adjudicated incompetent). Fifth, it provides a basic source 
of demographic information about family populations. 
Sixth, it establishes a framework for developing numerous 
other rules, regulations, and policies based on the 
relationships and data reflected in the koseki data fields. 
Seventh, these other rules can be used to reinforce the 
system by according benefits to registration and 
disadvantages to not registering. Eighth, the system is 
flexible in that it can be adjusted to add or remove 
attributes that should be registered or are no longer 
necessary, as well as the manner in which they are 
expressed in the registration system. Ninth, in the past, 
the koseki was an open-access system that provided a 
useful reference to anyone considering interactions with a 
particular family or family member. Tenth, the system 
functions in a code-like fashion in preventing legally 
prohibited “transactions” such as bigamy from occurring 
in the first place. Finally, it helps maintain its own 
integrity and usefulness by prohibiting registrations that 
do not include the required information in the required 
format.  
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IV. WHAT WOULD A ROBOT KOSEKI 
SYSTEM LOOK LIKE?  
We can now return to the subject of regulating robots and 
how it could be informed by the koseki system. Of course 
the koseki system does not provide a perfect analogy. It 
registers as a single unit a family comprised of multiple 
separate actors each capable of independent agency and 
action. Robots, whether registered are not, will generally 
be single units behaving as sole actors, but with multiple 
other parties (programmers, manufacturers, owners, etc.) 
who are essentially passive but potentially have rights or 
liabilities attributable to its acts. Nonetheless, the author 
believes that the legal aspects of the parent-child 
relationship in particular, as well as other family 
relationships that can be confirmed through the koseki
system, provide a very useful basic source of analogies for 
robot regulation. The remainder of this article will be 
devoted to some preliminary speculation and suggestions 
about what a Robot Koseki might look like.  
A. Definitional Attributes
First, as indicated at the outset, one of the most important 
functions of the Robot Koseki would be definitional. Just 
as the Japanese koseki system defines who is Japanese 
and who is not, the Robot Koseki would divide the world 
into registered Robots and unregistered technology 
systems. This latter universe might include systems that 
have many attributes commonly associated with “robots.” 
However, they would not be Robots for purposes of the 
registration system, or the rules and regulations tied to it. 
In fact, the only difference between two otherwise 
identical technology systems might be that one is 
registered in the Robot Koseki as Robot and the other is 
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not. This difference could be—should be—quite significant 
not only for legal purposes but, as discussed below, for 
practical reasons relating to the comparative utility of the 
registered Robot over the unregistered technology system.    
The definitional function of the Robot Koseki does 
not need to be entirely binary. Within the universe of 
registered Robots, it would be possible to provide for 
various sub-categories of Robot that could have differing 
attributes and registration criteria. These could be used 
for purposes of applying additional technical 
requirements within the registration parameters, or 
imposing external class-specific rules. Some of the 
existing literature on the regulation of specific types of 
robots and introduced earlier on this article suggest that 
sub-categories might be based on the task the robots 
perform (service, transportation, etc.), the environment in 
which it operates or should be limited to (water, spare, air, 
land, inside, outside), the manner in which the robot 
“manifests itself” or exists (embodied physical robots, or 
primarily virtual ones), the manner in which the robot 
interacts with humans, or the degree of autonomy it will 
have.119
Whether there are sub-categories of registered 
Robots, a key aspect of the system will be in providing a 
de facto definition of non-Robots. This will enable the 
system to be used as a framework for developing 
additional rules that discriminate against unregistered 
robots by according increasing benefits and advantages to 
the creation and use of Robots that are registered, and 
disadvantages to the creation and use of those that are not. 
The merits and demerits of registration would be both 
legal and technological, the latter possibly developing in 
the form of greater network accessibility and 
119  See Palmerini, supra note 31, at 7 (stating that some of the 
categories anticipated are mentioned). 
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interoperability with other technology systems. The use of 
this definitional function in conjunction with suitable 
registration parameters would have significant social and 
commercial utility in associating registered Robots with 
safety and an identifiable nexus of liability.    
B. Registration Parameters and Criteria 
The registration parameters and criteria—the data fields 
that need to be filled in a Japanese koseki offer some 
analogies—would themselves form part of the regulatory 
foundation of the Robot Koseki system. Only robots 
satisfying the parameters would be eligible for 
registration. This would be part of the system’s merit: 
being a registered Robot would provide third parties with 
assurances that it satisfies certain minimum standards as 
to technical specifications, safety, information, possible 
liability nexuses, and so forth. Hard and soft law 
requirements as well as technical rules and regulations 
can then be built by governments and private actors based 
on these standards.  
What these parameters should be is a matter for 
further consideration. Some may be optional and others 
mandatory. In general terms, however, they can be 
assumed to be primarily technological and informational. 
These subjects are developed further below.    
C. The Robot Koseki as a Technology-Based 
System
Unlike the Japanese koseki system, which was originally 
based on paper ledgers, the Robot Koseki would be based 
on modern technology, rooted in code, hardware, and 
network systems. The technological aspects of the system 
would dictate some of the registration criteria—the 
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technical specifications—that a robot would have to 
satisfy in order to be registered.  
A detailed discussion of those parameters is a 
subject for another time and probably a more technically 
astute author. However it is easy to envisage that it would 
include requirements and specifications such as those 
relating to: (i) the method the Robot uses to interact with 
other technology systems (WiFi, USB, QR codes, 
Bluetooth, RFID, etc.); (ii) basic safety parameters as to 
size, speed of motility, etc.; (iii) location (e.g., incorporation 
of GPS; compatibility with geo-fencing systems, etc.); (iv) 
cybersecurity requirements (anti-malware/ requirements, 
etc.); (v) access requirements (i.e., if the Robot Koseki 
system requires Robots to submit to software updates for 
various purposes, the Robot will have to be set to accept 
such updates regularly); (vi) privacy protection (e.g.,
mandatory data encryption and access restrictions for 
video, voice, and other data recorded by the Robot); (vii) 
operating system; (viii) override capability (e.g., a kill 
switch that can be used remotely to shut the Robot down 
remotely when necessary in emergency situations);120 (ix) 
sensory capabilities for perceiving the world (video, sound, 
motion sensors, facial recognition technology, etc.); and (x) 
120 For those who actually worry about such things, this could include 
the doomsday scenario depicted in the Terminator movie series in 
which an AI becomes self-aware and uses robots to try to destroy 
humanity. As noted by Marchant and Stevens, some people 
apparently do worry about such things, since the European 
Parliament has passed resolutions requiring robot designers to 
include a kill switch to deactivate the robot if it is causing problems. 
Gary E. Marchant & Yvonne A. Stevens, Resilience: A New Tool in the 
Risk Governance Toolbox for Emerging Technologies, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 233, 270 (2017) (citing Resolution of 16 Feb. 2017 with 
Recommendations to the Commission on Civil Law Rules on Robotics, 
EUR. PARL. DOC. (2015/2103(INL)) (2017) (requiring that designers of 
robots “integrate obvious opt-out mechanisms (kill switches) that 
should be consistent with reasonable design objectives”)). 
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a “black box” that records all that is happening inside the 
Robot (software updates, a log of what and how the robot 
may have “learned” to do things etc.), and which can be 
used for forensic purposes, if necessary. Further 
mechanisms may be necessary to (for example) address 
the safety, integrity and rights (or denial) of access to the 
vast amount of data robots may be able to record and store. 
Roboticists will doubtless have other suggestions as to 
what technological parameters should be included. 
D. Informational Parameters: Creating a 
Robotic Identity 
Registration systems are essentially informational, and 
the Robot Koseki would be no different. First, just as cars, 
mobile phones, and numerous other technological devices 
have unique identifying codes, Robots registered in the 
system would also be assigned unique identifying codes or 
numbers that would become a key part of its identity. 
Codes identifying members of the same series or 
production line of robots could also be used. Robot 
Identification Numbers could even serve as taxpayer 
identification numbers if the Robot is accorded legal 
personality and the ability to engage in revenue-
producing activities.  
The Robot Koseki would presumably also require 
various technical information about the Robot to be 
included as part of its registration details—operating 
system, whether it contain a camera, recording devices, 
the nature of its power source and so forth. Some of this 
information would be necessary to confirm whether the 
Robot is eligible for registration in the first place, but 
others might be optional but useful for other persons and 
technology systems trying to ascertain whether they 
should interact with a particular Robot.  
The Robot Koseki 
456 Journal of Business & Technology Law 
Notwithstanding the technical aspects of Robots 
and our proposed Robot Koseki, it must be remembered 
the goal is to have a registry that facilitates the 
development and use of Robots compatible with and 
amenable to regulation and enforcement outside of the 
sphere of technology, including through the “traditional” 
legal system. 
For this reason, some of the key registration 
parameters should provide information about people 
involved in the creation and ongoing existence of the Robot, 
people who through the system will effectively become a 
part of the Robot’s identity. This is where the Japanese 
koseki system provides a particularly useful model, since 
it involves the registration of a single unit (the family) 
that is comprised of multiple constituents. If we are to 
develop robot law from family law analogies and attempt 
to regulate Robots as a form of “perpetual children,” then 
the koseki system will make it possible to identify who is 
analogous to their parent(s).  
Thus, the mandatory registration criteria for a 
Robot should include identification of certain categories of 
persons. Whether such persons can include corporations 
is a question for further consideration; if a key goal of the 
system is to ensure a nexus of responsibility for robotic 
behavior is always identifiable, this goal may not be best 
served if some or all of these informational requirements 
can be satisfied through the use of artificial entities 
(corporations) whose core utility lies in their ability to 
obfuscate and limit liability (which is, after all, a synonym 
for “responsibility”). As for the categories of persons that 
should be included in the registration details, some that 
seem obvious to someone writing in the year 2019 are: 
maker (or manufacturer), programmer, owner, and user. 
Who should be named in these categories may not 
be as difficult as one may first imagine. “Maker” would 
COLIN P.A. JONES
Journal of Business & Technology Law 457 
most easily be a large company engaged in the mass 
production of consumer robots, like Japan’s Pepper or 
Aibo—a manufacturer. On the other side of the spectrum 
would be hobbyists or inventors creating their own robots, 
out of individual components or kits. There should not be 
any impediment to the latter category registering as well, 
and the system should require them to know enough about 
the construction of the robot they are making in order to 
do so.  
Defining “programmer” may be more complicated. 
Or maybe not: mass-produced consumer robots will likely 
have standard software that is attributable to a particular 
vendor. But other robots may be empty shells that can be 
programmed by the owner or third parties (or even other 
robots). Other robots may rely on open-source or crowd-
sourced software that is not easily attributable to a 
particular individual or entity. Some may sit empty until 
“occupied” by an AI “presence” through a network 
connection, here again attribution of the source of the 
programming may be difficult. But perhaps this should 
not matter; for purposes of the registration system it may 
not be as important to identify the source or sources of the 
code that gives the robot life, but who is presumptively 
responsible for allowing it to do so. In this sense, perhaps 
the correct term is not “programmer” but “gatekeeper.” 
Default rules may be possible; for example, the 
manufacturer could be responsible for programming, or 
even just “programmability,” unless the owner or some 
other party changes the software, in which case the 
burden of proof as to the absence of liability could shift to 
that person.  
“Owner” would seem to be a fairly obvious 
category of required information and one that most robot 
owners would likely want to make clear. “User” may not 
be necessary, but it is easy to envision a future where 
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robots are rented out for short periods or lease-financed 
for extended periods by people unwilling or unable to 
make capital investments in expensive robots. In fact, 
depending on how it is implemented, the Robot Koseki 
could also simultaneously serve as or augment platforms 
for buying, selling or renting out robots, perhaps even 
combined with a digital currency.  
The system would of course need to be capable of 
promptly reflecting changes in the information about at 
least some of the persons comprising a Robot’s identity—
in much the same way that marriages, divorces and other 
changes in personal status are reflected in the koseki, or
changes in title of registered property. Like cars a Robot 
might go through several owners. Just as the Japanese 
koseki system fails to reflect the realities of family life—a 
couple registered as husband and wife may be long 
estranged and living apart with new partners—the Robot
Koseki may not always be up to date as to who is actually 
the owner, user, or programmer of a Robot at any given 
time. However, both technical and legal incentives can be 
built into the system to encourage registration of changes. 
Liability for a robot should remain with the registered 
person or persons unless a change in status is also 
registered. Again, part of the system’s value broader value 
would be its function as a reliable source of information 
about robotic identity for innocent third parties.  
While it might seem unfair to hold a registered 
owner responsible for harm caused by a robot that has 
been stolen, hijacked, or hacked, the harshness of default 
rules such as “the owner is responsible” can be mitigated 
through other rules allowing for a shifting of the burden 
of proof once evidence of hacking or theft is introduced. In 
any case, it is these informational aspects of the system 
that may prove most important, since that is how more 
general rules of robotic law can be developed, either 
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through the existing rules of law such as products liability 
or the creation of new ones that attribute robot behavior 
to identified categories of people.  
The author believes that many of the issues raised 
at the beginning of this article can be resolved through the 
development of rules based on the criteria and parameters 
of a registration system: who is responsible for harm 
caused by the Robot, who enjoys the fruits of its labors, 
who is entitled to assert privacy rights in the data it 
gathers and so forth can all be tied to a small universe of 
possible persons identifiable through the registration 
system, and so forth. Further rules can be developed as 
between this possible universe through contracts. Clarity 
as to who is liable for the robot will facilitate the 
development of standard robot insurance products. In fact, 
a digital certificate of insurance coverage could be one of 
the registration parameters, either optional or mandatory.  
These are the easy, specific examples already 
receiving the attention of those who debate robot law and 
introduced earlier in this article. Yet there are doubtless 
numerous other areas where a framework that clearly 
identifies a limited universe of possible obligors or 
claimants will be useful. 
Let us take the rules of possession in the law of 
property as an example. Say a shopping mall security 
robot finds a dropped wallet; it picks it up and proceeds 
towards the mall office. A passer-by grabs it from the 
Robot and starts to walk away. In this example there may 
well be an interesting bar-exam type question along the 
lines of “what crime has been committed, if any?”  
But before we can answer that question, we should 
be able to define who, if anyone, is able to claim possession 
of the wallet once the robot has picked it up. Is the robot 
acting as agent for someone, and if so who? The mall’s 
owner? The robot’s owner (it could be provided by a 
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management company)? The wallet’s yet-to-be-identified 
owner?
This article will not offer an answer. However, the 
example hopefully illustrates how it would be useful to 
have rules that facilitate attributing physical possession 
(or an agency relationship) to an identifiable person 
associated with the robot. A registration system with 
suitable information parameters would make it possible 
to develop simple rules of broad applicability that would 
quickly be comprehensible to the population at large. 
While the system will facilitate the development of new 
rules and laws that take into account the special nature of 
robots, it will also facilitate applying existing rules of law 
with necessary modifications or through judicial 
precedent. As with possession, well-established rules 
about the creation, attribution and ownership of new 
property (including intellectual property) can also be 
developed through the registry system. To the extent 
robots are capable of harming other people or their 
property, the system can be used to apportion rights or 
liabilities to multiple parties; comparative negligence 
between programmer, owner, and user, for example.  
Some of these rules may be subject to variations, 
exclusions or fine tuning through contract. But having an 
identifiable status vis-à-vis a robot will naturally 
facilitate the development of contractual rules and 
practices relating to robots as well. They key thing is that 
there will always be a responsible human (or at least a 
corporation) who can be identified, with Robots effectively 
being treated as “permanent children” as far as liability 
for their acts and attribution of their property are 
concerned.121
121 For those concerned with what the author considers to be largely 
speculative philosophical questions such as “should robots have 
freedom of speech” or “should robots be granted personhood,” the 
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Whatever the informational and technical 
registration parameters of the system are, it will be 
desirable that they are capable of expansion and 
modification. The system will need to be able to evolve to 
reflect technological developments and new regulatory 
requirements, including the ability to expunge 
requirements that are obsolete or no longer appropriate.
E. The Robot Koseki as a Soft Law and 
Private Law Initiative 
One important difference between the Robot Koseki and 
the Japanese Koseki is that a robot registry could be 
established first through industry action, starting first as 
a creature of code, of soft law and technical standards. 
This being the case, it could be driven primarily by 
industry players, professional associations or open 
standards organization comparable to the Internet 
Engineering Task Force, which has developed many of the 
rules and standards governing the technical aspects of the 
Internet.122 In the same way that industry standards and 
Robot Koseki would also provide an answer. Registration in the Robot 
Koseki would be the first step to possible “adulthood”—autonomy free 
from the Koseki, or perhaps transfer to a higher order registry of 
“sentient” robots that still contains features intended to secure 
human control, oversight and safety. Such concerns will remain in the 
realm of science fiction for the foreseeable future (hopefully). See also,
F. Patrick Hubbard, “Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, 
Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1862 (2014) 
(stating some authors have suggested that sophisticated robots may 
have such high levels of learning and autonomy that they could be 
treated as employees under the respondeat superior doctrine (which 
imposes vicarious non-fault liability on employers), as children, or as 
animals (which could also result in non-fault liability of owners or 
users)). 
122 See generally THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE,
https://www.ietf.org/. The Internet Protocol (IP) and WiFi originate 
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soft law have brought us much of the generally 
interoperable technologies that drive the Internet and 
many of the devices connected to it, whether it is Internet 
Protocol, WiFi, USB, or countless other commonly used 
technologies, the development of the Robot Koseki does 
not need to wait for government action.123
The likelihood that the system will be based in 
code is another reason why it is probably unnecessary for 
the government to drive a registration initiative. To the 
extent that the system operates through computer code 
that automatically prevents non-conforming robots from 
being registered and enables other technology systems to 
decide automatically whether and how to interact with 
those that are, formal legal rules will be unnecessary to 
govern those interactions.  
It should thus be feasible to establish a private 
consortium-based Robot Koseki system. The key, however, 
will likely be in the establishment of one that has 
sufficient utility to government bodies (including courts) 
from standards developed by the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE). https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/ 
7100280/. The USB standard was originally developed through a 
consortium of computer hardware manufacturers. UNIVERSAL SERIAL 
BUS, http://www.usb.org/home (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
Organizations like the Robotic Industries Association whose activities 
include setting standards for robot safety already exist, of course, 
though they do not appear to be addressing the subject in the context 
of Robotic identity. See, e.g., ROBOTICS INDUS. ASS’N, https://www. 
robotics.org/robotic-standards (last visited Apr. 17, 2019). 
123 Who We Are, WIFI ALLIANCE, https://www.wi-fi.org/who-we-are 
(last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (stating that a WiFi alliance of industry 
players supporting the standard exists); About, USB, http:// 
www.usb.org/about (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (stating USB 
Implementers Forum was founded by a group of companies); Global 
Robotic Standards, ROBOTICS INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www. 
robotics.org/robotic-standards (last visited Mar. 9, 2019) (discussing 
that organizations like the Robotic Industries Association include 
activities such as setting standards for robot safety). 
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that are able to use it as a framework for developing hard-
law rules and regulations of the type posited above. By 
way of example, governments in some countries are 
already requiring commercial providers of “smart bike” 
bicycle sharing services to incorporate geo-fencing 
technology, though they did not develop the technology 
itself. 124  The likelihood of similar requirements being 
imposed on Robots in such countries and elsewhere seems 
high but could be readily accomplished through an 
existing registration system.  
The challenge will be in allowing industry to 
develop a system that is not too favorable to robot 
designers and owners, one that obfuscates liability rather 
than clarifies it. Here is where at least some degree of 
government involvement (or perhaps judicial activism) 
will be desirable. In order for the system to have broad 
social utility, it will need to make as many people as 
possible feel safe about robots, or at least Robots. Social 
utility could see the development of a virtuous cycle which 
encourages more people to register their robots in the 
Robot Koseki, and in doing so satisfy the registration 
parameters. Governments can facilitate this goal by 
incorporating a registration requirement into regulations 
or procurement specifications that involve robots.125
124  Yingzhi Yang, Singapore Requires ‘Geofencing’ for all Bike-
Sharing Operators in the City by the End of this Year, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST (June 4, 2018), http://www.scmp.com/tech/enterprises/ 
article/2149218/singapore-requires-geofencing-all-bike-sharing-
operators-city-end. 
125 Concerns about the impact of robotic liability on innovation seems 
an obvious area where the registration system could be used to grant 
advantages to registration that would not accrue to unregistered 
robots. Such concerns have been well expressed by Ryan Calo, among 
others. See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REV. 571 (2011). 
Some might argue that complying with the various restraints of the 
registration system would hinder innovation, but that would be the 
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F. Robots and the Internet of Things  
Not only will the Robot Koseki be a creature of technology, 
but it will be one of networked technology. Robots and 
other technology systems that interact with the registry 
will need to be able to communicate with the registry 
system through the Internet or other network technology. 
The system would need to work in a way so that that the 
current registration details of each Robot was accessible 
to other technology systems (which might include other 
Robots) interacting with it. There are doubtless numerous 
design strategies. It could be based on a centralized or 
distributed database system. It could be based wholly or 
in part on blockchain or a similar distributed ledger 
system (which would facilitate incorporating robots into 
payment systems). Whether robots themselves would act 
as components of the network/ledger, or passively interact 
with it would, along with the foregoing other 
considerations, be a design choice that may be driven by 
the technical capabilities reflected in the registration 
parameters that individual robots must satisfy. To the 
extent robots may incorporate private data in the 
informational data fields or whatever sensory and 
recording equipment it incorporates, it may be necessary 
to establish various levels of access to the Robot, such as 
distinguishing between technical information that may be 
freely accessible, but personal information about owners 
and users or video/sound data recorded on internal 
storage media which could require a higher level of access 
or some element of legal process.  
The distributed nature of the system would mean 
compromise. In any case, it is an unusual argument that persons who 
receive no direct benefit from robotic innovations should bear some of 
the costs in the form of damage to their property, physical injury, or 
even death. 
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that, like the Internet itself, it would be relatively 
unconstrained by borders, unless efforts are put into 
imposing such through constraints. Examples could 
include mandatory geo-fencing constraints that affect 
operability outside or within political borders. Since 
Robots will have a significant data-gathering capability, 
the impact of various personal data protection regimes 
may be a factor. Depending on the nation involved, this 
may be a primary reason for government involvement in 
the development of the Robot Koseki system, or at least 
the local version of it.  
G. A System of Systems 
While for ease of reference this article generally refers to 
“the” Robot Koseki as a single system, the existence of 
multiple systems is possible or even desirable. For 
example, if the jurisdiction-specific registration systems 
do develop as anticipated in the previous section, there 
would be pressure for them to be inoperable to an extent. 
This could in turn facilitate the development of legal or de
facto “robot nationality” or at least the rules addressing 
the legal status of robots who cross national borders.126
 It may also be possible that even within a single 
126 One set of questions that few discussing robot law seem to have 
asked, let alone tried to answer is: what happens—or should 
happen—when a robot autonomously decides to cross a border? Has 
the border been illegally crossed in some way? Does anything happen 
to the property rights of the owner in such a Robot? Edmund 
Mokhtarian proposes robots with “international modules” that allow 
them to switch to compliance with a different set of laws upon crossing 
a border. Edmund Mokhtarian, The Bot Legal Code: Developing a 
Legally Compliant Artificial Intelligence, 21 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
145, 150 (2018). This could indeed be a valuable component of a 
comprehensive registration system such as proposed in this paper, 
but does not actually answer any of the above questions.  
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jurisdiction there will be multiple, overlapping or even 
competing systems. It may transpire that the tremendous 
possible variety of robots means that different systems are 
needed. To the extent Robots can be modified and 
upgraded (or downgraded), it may also be possible for 
them to ‘evolve’ and become eligible for higher order 
registry systems that enjoy greater regulatory, social or 
commercial benefits. Perhaps there can even be a process 
for dealing with the question that some in the field of robot 
law and ethics are already discussing—what should 
happen to a robot who becomes self-aware? They can 
either be transferred to the highest order of Koseki or “set 
free” from all registration requirements, having matured 
away from the status of “permanent child” that the Robot 
Koseki is otherwise designed to impose. This takes us well 
into the realm of science fiction, but just as the Japanese 
koseki system enables children to leave the parental 
registration upon maturity, a Robot Koseki would solve 
another problem that is already discussed by those in the 
fields of robot law and ethics.  
 Finally, even a single Robot Koseki would 
naturally come to be part of a “system of systems” as other 
technologies developed to interact with it. The simplest 
example would be access restrictions that allow registered 
Robots into public spaces but exclude unregistered ones, 
similar to pet door flap that only open for the animal(s) 
with the appropriate embedded RFID chip. More complex 
examples would be payment systems that enable robots to 
transact independently of human decision and for tax 
liabilities to be imposed and paid appropriately.  
V. CLOSING REMARKS 
This article has attempted to illustrate how comparative 
law may provide a useful but different set of analogies for 
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thinking about how robots should be regulated. At risk of 
repetition, the view of the author is that one of the most 
important and basic tasks facing practical robot law is 
definitional; both the establishment of a definition of 
“robot” itself, as well as specific attributes (the 
registration parameter) of a robot that can provide 
adequate structure for further regulation, whether 
through law or private ordering. In short, the key task is 
to establish rules of robotic identity. The technical aspects 
of a Robot Koseki will be a matter for technologists to 
develop, but it is hoped that the primarily western-driven 
focus of robot law can benefit from analogies from other 
legal systems of the world.127
 Perhaps someday in the future the Robot Koseki 
will even see the overthrow of Asimov’s laws of robotics. 
Perhaps someday the first law of robots will be: A Robot 
Shall be Registered in the Robot Koseki.  
127  At the time of writing the author had filed a utility patent 
application for a robot registry system. 
